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Abstract. Emin Gu¨n Sirer once said3: It’s clear that writing a robust,
secure smart contract requires extreme amounts of diligence. It’s more
similar to writing code for a nuclear power reactor, than to writing loose
web code [. . . ] Yet the current Solidity language and underlying EVM
seems designed more for the latter.
Formal methods (FM) are mathematics-based software development meth-
ods aimed at producing “code for a nuclear power reactor”. That is,
due application of FM can produce bug-free, zero-defect, correct-by-
construction, guaranteed, certified software. However, the software in-
dustry seldom use FM. One of the main reasons for such a situation is
that there exists the perception (which might well be a fact) that FM
increase software costs. On the other hand, FM can be partially applied
thus producing high-quality software, although not necessarily bug-free.
In this paper we outline some FM related techniques whose application
the cryptocurrency community should take into consideration because
they could bridge the gap between “loose web code” and “code for a
nuclear power reactor”.
1 Introduction
Given that cryptocurrency software deals with virtual money, software errors
can produce irreparable loses. Furthermore, they are a valuable target of highly
skilled attackers. Therefore, if a cryptocurrency software has an exploitable vul-
nerability chances are that attackers will eventually use it to steal money. In
fact, some attacks have already been mounted against cryptocurrency software
causing irreparable loses of money and credibility (e.g. [13]).
Note that cryptocurrency software face a more complex problem than tradi-
tional banking systems. If your homebanking account is hacked your money can
be (potentially) wired transferred to one or more bank accounts anywhere on
Earth. But these accounts have registered owners who can be duly prosecuted,
although some times you will not get your money back. If the same happens in
the cryptocurrency world you will not have a registered owner and so prosecution
will be harder, if possible.
3 hackingdistributed.com/2016/06/17/thoughts-on-the-dao-hack.
Hence, software errors in the cryptocurrency world are potentially more costly
than the same class of errors in traditional banking systems. Therefore, the
quality of cryptocurrency software should be, at least, one “level” higher than
that of banking software. Although banking software is not (always) “loose web
code”, it certainly is not “code for a nuclear power reactor”.
For these reasons the cryptocurrency community is seeking for approaches,
methods, techniques and development practices that can reduce the chances of
the presence of either errors or vulnerabilities4. The traditional banking system
has less incentives to pursue high levels of software quality and thus to seek
better development practices.
One such approach is the application of Formal Methods (FM) to software
construction. FM are development methods based on mathematics and logic.
They have been around in academia for at least 50 years. There have been
undergraduate courses around the globe teaching FM for decades. A number
of scientific journals and international conferences are devoted to the study,
progess and application of FM. FM is the working field of hundreds of researchers
across the planet. The FM community has produced breakthrough results on
fundamental aspects of Computer Science and some of its most prominent actors
have earned international prizes such as the Turing Award. Leading companies
such as Microsoft and Amazon hire software engineers or researchers on FM to
produce or apply FM.
When FM are fully applied they produce “code for a nuclear power reactor”.
That is, due application of FM can produce bug-free, zero-defect, correct-by-
construction, guaranteed, certified software. There are a number of critical or
mission critical software systems that were developed with FM.
However, the software industry seldom use FM. There are several reasons
for which industry is reluctant to use FM among which we can cite: a pervasive
underrating of software quality (usually in favor of innovation or as the conse-
quence of free distribution5); either the perception or the fact that FM severely
increase costs and extend schedules; at times the sheer fact that managers do
not have a clue about the existence of FM; and the difficulties of finding the
right technical staff.
In this paper we present the case for the application of FM to cryptocur-
rency software. In Sect. 2 we present some guidelines for the adoption of FM
in cryptocurrency software projects. We argue that set-based formal modeling
(or specification), simulation, prototyping and automated proof can be applied
before considering more powerful approaches such as code formal verification.
Hence, in Sect. 3 we show excerpts of a set-based formal specification of a con-
sensus protocol and in Sect. 4 of the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). In Sect.
5 we show that prototypes can be generated from these formal models and sim-
ulations can be run on them. Then, we show that test cases can be generated
4 Actually, the presence of certain errors lead to the existence of vulnerabilities.
5 That is: Why should I produce bug-free software if I am not sure anyone will use it?
Why are you asking me for a warranty if I am giving you this program for free?
from the same models and how automated proof can be used to evaluate the
correctness of these models.
2 Guidelines for Formal Methods Adoption
This section presents guidelines that the cryptocurrency community can consider
for the adoption of FM. It starts with a brief and broad presentation of FM.
2.1 Formal methods in a nutshell
As we have said, FM is a class of software development techniques based on
mathematics and formal logic that can be applied to different development ac-
tivities and phases6. The main goal of FM is to improve the confidence on the
correctness of a program. Program correctness is usually defined as follows: a
program is correct if it verifies its specification. The word ‘verifies’ can be re-
placed by ‘satisfies’, ‘refines’, ‘respects’, etc. In any case, the fundamental idea
is that you have a program, P , and its specification, S , and a FM provides you
a way to ensure, with different levels of confidence, that P behaves as S states.
In FM the specification or model, S plays a central role:
– S should be written from the requirements, not from the program; ideally S
should be written before P is developed.
– S is a formal description; that is, in a sense, S is a mathematical model or
formula.
– S represents a family of programs: from S you can get a number of different
programs; S does not fix a particular implementation.
– S should be simpler and shorter than P but, fundamentally, it should be
more evidently correct than P . That is, when you read S you should feel
you are reading something that obviously describes what you want.
– S should abstract away as many implementation details as possible. Imple-
menting a program entails giving enough details as to a computer can execute
it. A huge number of these details are nonexistent in the requirements. For
example, at the requirements level one simply says “if the customer is a new
one, then add it to the data base”, while a C implementation might use a
singly-linked list to store customers and so checking if the customer exists
and adding it requires pointer arithmetic. In this case, pointer arithmetic is
an implementation detail that should not be visible in S .
– S is usually a functional specification but it can also be a security specifica-
tion (or whatever other non-functional requirement). Then, FM can be used
to verify that P correctly does what it is supposed to do and that it does
that securely.
Then, the application of FM starts by writing a formal specification of your
software. It does not mean you must write a complete specification; it can be
6 FM can be applied to hardware systems, too.
the specification of a portion of your program (usually the most complex or the
most critical). It has been proved countless times that the mere fact of writing
S clarifies ideas, pops up unseen problems, etc. Is this a waste of time and
resources, or an added cost? No, it is not. These unseen problems will flow into
code and sooner or later they will produce unwanted behaviors. Actually, writing
S can save you time and money.
Depending on the particular FM you are using, once you have S you can
keep applying formal techniques such as:
1. S can be checked for different levels of soundness.
2. S can be used as a prototype.
3. S can be used to generate test cases.
4. S can be handled to the development team (i.e P is implemented from S ).
5. S can be used to formally generate a correct-by-construction P .
All these activities improve the confidence on the correctness (either func-
tional or security) of your software; only the last one can guarantee correctness
but it is the most demanding in terms of time, effort and technical proficiency.
Depending on the context, many of these techniques can be automated to some
extent, and some times they can be fully automated. The first activity can un-
cover errors in S thus removing them before they make into P . The difference
between 4 and 5 is that in 4 developers just read S and write P while in 5
developers formally prove that P implements S .
There are a number of FM and formal techniques. There are old, endur-
ing, established, assessed, supported FM and there are new, experimental ones.
None of them is a silver bullet: if it is very expressive, then it will be harder to
automate, and vice versa; if its models are abstract, then program correctness
will be harder to be formally proved; if its models are less abstract, then their
complexity can be similar to that of the implementation. In general, each FM
was thought and designed to be applied to a class of systems or for a particular
verification activity. For example, there are FM to specify and analyze informa-
tion systems; others more suitable for concurrency; there are very expressive FM
aimed at full formal verification; and others aimed at automated verification of
limited classes of programs.
In any case, the determining factor of a FM is its specification language.
The specification language somewhat fixes what can be expressed, what formal
techniques are possible and which can be automated to some valuable extent.
The specification language determines the form of your models or specifications.
Each specification language is based on some well-known mathematical or logic
theory; they always have a formal semantics. There are specification languages
based on set theory, type theory, relation algebra, process algebra, transition
systems, first-order logic, category theory, higher-order logic, temporal logic,
etc. Some specification languages resemble high-level programming languages,
most look like math+logic. Nevertheless, specification languages are to high-
level programming languages what the latter are to machine code. That is, you
can implement a formal specification in any given programming language.
2.2 Components of cryptocurrency software
A cryptocurrency software may encompass the following: cryptographic primi-
tives, cryptographic protocols, consensus protocols, a blockchain, a virtual ma-
chine, a scripting language, a contract-oriented programming language, a wallet
a number of smart contracts. Orthogonal to those the system runs on top of one
or more operating systems and the TCP/IP stack, and it has been programmed
in one or more programming languages with their corresponding compilers or
interpreters. Yet orthogonal to all that you have complex functional and secu-
rity requirements. And finally, a cryptocurrency software is usually a distributed
system.
Any error on any of those components can potentially produce a failure or a
vulnerability. That is, an error on any of those components can potentially affect
the functional correctness of the system or its security.
Guaranteeing that a cryptocurrency software will never fail and will never
be hacked (at least by using any known attack technique) entails proving that
all those components are functional and security correct, which in turn requires
a formal specification of each component and the interactions between them—
which, in particular, includes giving a formal semantics to all the programming
languages involved. If you program your blockchain on Rust and the Rust com-
piler has some error, then your system is potentially vulnerable; if you are using
a proven cryptographic primitive whose implementation happens to hide an ob-
scure error, then your system is potentially vulnerable.
Certifying the functional and security correctness of such a system is, cur-
rently, a challenging task even for seasoned FM experts. Fortunately, in many
cases each component can be independently certified and, furthermore, many
verification tasks (cf. items 1-4 above) can be carried on before attempting a
formal correctness proof. Indeed, so far, the FM community has formally veri-
fied (some times parts of) some of the components of a cryptocurrency software
such as, cryptographic primitives [37], compilers [30], communication protocols
[33], cryptographic protocols [6], secure operating systems [28]. However, as far
as we know, a formal proof of the scale and scope necessary for a full-fledged
cryptocurrency software has never been attempted.
2.3 Cryptocurrency software as critical systems
If society will eventually depend on a cryptocurrency software its correctness
proof should be attempted. Indeed, if a cryptocurrency software ever plays an
important role in the society it will be that of a critical system. That is, of a
system whose failure would cause irreparable loses—as a failure in the software
controlling a nuclear power reactor. If the error or the attack causes the unwanted
transfer of cryptomoney, the victims will not be able to recover it due to the
virtual nature of cryptocurrencies and because many of these systems enforce
strong privacy and anonymity protections.
On the other hand, critical software has been the main target of FM since
their inception. For example, the railway industry has been applying FM for its
critical systems for quite a long time [29]; computer security has been one of
the traditional application domains of FM for almost 50 years [7, 21, 28, 4, 9, 5];
several other industrial sectors such as nuclear, defense, health care, etc. apply
FM to some of their critical software projects where, in average, 80% report no
increase in development time, +90% report no added costs, and 88% report on
improved quality [20].
Developers of cryptocurrency software should not be scared about using
mathematics as a tool to describe software. In fact, Nakamoto uses math in
his seminal paper on Bitcoin [34] and Wood uses it to describe the EVM [43].
However, these descriptions would not be understood as FM because they are
not based on standardized notations nor on clear mathematical theories. On the
other hand, recently, the FM community has started to pay attention to cryp-
tocurrency software. Idelberger et al. [26] propose to use defeasible logic frame-
works such as Formal Contract Logic for the description of smart contracts.
Bhargavan et al. [11] compile Solidity programs into a verification-oriented
functional language where they can verify source code. Luu et al. [32] use the
Oyente tool to find and detected vulnerabilities in smart contracts. Hirai [25]
use Lem to formally specify the EVM; Grishchenko, Maffei and Schneidewind
[22] also formalize the EVM but in F*; and Hildenbrandt et al. do the same but
with the reachability logic system known as K. Pıˆrlea and Sergey [36] present a
Coq [41, 8] formalization of a blockchain consensus protocol where some prop-
erties are formally verified. Finally, in [10] Betarte et al. present and briefly
discuss (formally) properties and outline the basis of a model-driven verification
approach to address the certification of the correctness of a particular imple-
mentation of the MimbleWimble cryptocurrency protocol.
2.4 A gradual adoption process
Hence, the cryptocurrency community should consider the adoption of FM for
the developtment of its critical software components. However, the adoption of
FM is not only a technical challenge but, more importantly, it requires a sort
of cultural shift. In effect, the introduction of FM into the development process
requires new personnel or a thorough training of existing staff; the introduction
of new tools, techniques and processes; and, in some cases, a redesign of the de-
velopment cycle—e.g., you cannot change source code without first (re)proving
a theorem. Note that the works cited above are carried out by experts on FM.
If the cryptocurrency community wants to use FM then it either has to estab-
lish strong, mid-term collaboration projects with academic groups or start an
adoption program.
Due to the nature and dynamics of the cryptocurency ecosystem we think
that developers should slowly introduce FM into the development of cryptocur-
rency software. FM should become a new asset of the community rather than an
outsourced service. The following are some guidelines that can be considered:
1. Do not attempt a full formal correctness proof from the beginning.
2. Start with abstract specification languages (e.g. set theory) based on first-
order logic.
3. Learn to formally specify.
4. Put the verification of code aside for later, focus on writing good models.
5. Abstract away cryptography, assume it is correct, focus on functional speci-
fications.
6. Add lightweight or automated verification techniques such as simulation [23],
prototyping [16], model-based testing [42], model-checking [14] and auto-
mated proofs [35, 12].
7. Assess what you have learned, correct the course and move on.
In point 5 we suggest that cryptography should be abstracted away in this
first adoption stage. This might be generalized to security properties. The formal
verification of security properties is still a challenging issue (see Appendix A).
Formal verification of some cryptographic primitives has only been achieved
very recently [37]. Furthermore, formally proving non-trivial security properties
of code might be an overwhelming task in terms of the effort required, especially
compared with proving functional correctness. In addition, many implementation
details are orthogonal to the security properties to be established. This implies
that slight changes in the implementation technology might have devastating
consequences as concerns the security of the implementation.
Therefore, in this paper we show excerpts of a set-based formal model of two
components of a cryptocurrency software: a consensus protocol (Sect. 3) and
the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM, Sec. 4), where cryptography and security
are abstracted away. Besides, we show how these models can be easily, although
partially, analyzed by either lightweight or automated verification techniques
(Sect. 5).
3 Formal Specification of a Consensus Protocol
There are several FM based on set theory and first-order logic (e.g. Z [39], VDM
[27], B [1]). These notations are designed to write large, complex specifications;
and there is a number of tools to work with them such as editors, typecheckers,
theorem provers, animators, etc. However, in this paper we will use the plain
and simple language of mathematics extended with a couple of conventions, to
avoid explaining the peculiarities of a particular notation. This will be enough
as to show the ‘look-and-feel’ of such specifications.
The following are some snippets of a model of a consensus protocol based on
the work by Pıˆrlea and Sergey [36].
A consensus protocol deals with addresses, hashes, proof objects, etc. In an
abstract model of the protocol the internal structure of these entities is irrelevant.
In particular, hashes and proof objects are strongly related to cryptography
which is a feature we think should be abstracted away at this point. Then, we
have the set of all possible addresses (Addr) that can be used. If a ∈ Addr then
a is an address of the protocol. We do not know what a’s structure is, how it
was generated, whether it is 128 bits or 256 bits long, etc. The idea is that we
do not need to know those things now, because they are implementation details
which will not alter the fundamental behavior of the protocol. In this sense we
also have the set of hashes (Hash), the set of proofs objects (Proof ) and the
set of transactions (Tx ). The only condition required for these sets is that they
come equipped with equality and be pairwise disjoint.
[[Addr ,Hash,Proof ,Tx ]]
The block data structure (cf. blockchain) is a record with three fields: prev ,
(usually) points to the parent block; txs , stores the sequence of transactions
stored in the block; and pf is a proof object required to validate the block. Then
we define Block as the set of all such records:
Block =̂ [prev : Hash; txs : seqTx ; pf : Proof ]
The local state space of a participating network node is given by three state
variables: as , are the addresses of the peers this node is aware of; bf , is a block
forest (not shown) which records the minted and received blocks; and tp, is a set
of received transactions which eventually will be included in minted blocks.
LocState =̂ [as : PAddr ; bf : Hash 7→ Block ; tp : PTx ]
The protocol configuration is represented by two state variables: Delta, which
establishes a mapping between network addresses and the corresponding node
(local) states (in [36] this variable is referred to as the global state); and P , a set
of packets (which represent the messages exchanged by nodes).
Conf =̂ [Delta : Addr 7→ LocState; P : PPacket ]
Packets are just tuples of two addresses (origin and destination) and a message.
Packet == Addr ×Addr ×Msg
The model has twelve state transitions divided into two groups: local and global.
Local transitions are those executed by network nodes, while global transitions
promote local transitions to the network level. In turn, the local transitions
are grouped into receiving and internal transitions. Receiving transitions model
the nodes receiving messages from other nodes and, possibly, sending out new
messages; internal transitions model the execution of instructions run by each
node when some local condition is met. Here, we show only the local, receiving
transition named RcvAddr .
RcvAddr(s : LocState; p? : Packet ; ps ! : PPacket ; s ′ : LocState) =̂
p?.2 = this
∧ ∃ asm : PAddr •
p?.3 = AddrMsg asm
∧ s ′.as = s .as ∪ asm
∧ s ′.bf = s .bf ∧ s ′.tp = s .tp
∧ ps ! = {a : asm \ as • (p?.2, a,ConnectMsg)}
∪ {a : as • (p?.2, a,AddrMsg p′.as)}
As can be seen, RcvAddr transitions from the local state s into a new local
state s ′, receives a packet (p?), and sends out a set of packets (ps !). The node
checks whether or not the packet’s destination address coincides with its own
address. In that case, the node adds the received addresses to its local state
and sends out a set of packets that are either of the form (p?.2, a,ConnectMsg)
or (p?.2, a,AddrMsg p′.as). The former are packets generated from the received
addresses and sent to the new peers the node now knows, while the latter are
messages telling its already known peers that it has learned of new peers.
Observe that the expression after the =̂ symbol in RcvAddr is a predicate.
That is, for example, the equal symbol in s ′.as = s .as ∪ asm represents logical
equality and not (imperative) assignment; ∧ means logical conjunction and thus
p ∧ q is equal to q ∧ p; ∪ is set union; and so forth.
Hopefully, this simple example lets the reader see that abstract specifications
tend to be much simpler, concise and evidently correct than code. Furthermore,
much of what is said in an abstract specification is what seasoned programmers
think while designing good code. Then, formal specification languages give pro-
grammers an efficient technique by means of which they can write down their
best ideas and be able to communicate them easily and unambiguously. In most
cases using formal specifications in this way provides costs savings rather than
the opposite.
4 Formal Specification of the EVM
The same notation and methodology can be used to formally specify the EVM.
In this case we depart from the Yellow Paper [43]. The state of the EVM is given
by three records:
EVMState =̂ [World ; Machine; CallStack ]
where, for example World and Machine are defined as follows:
World =̂ [acc, accCC : Addr 7→ Acc; newaddr : Addr ; step : STEP ]
Machine =̂ [g : ETH ; pc : N; m : A 7→ B ; i : N; s : seqW ; out : P ]
where in turn, for instance, acc represents the Ethereum accounts as a partial
function from the set of addresses onto the set of records Acc =̂ [nonce : N; bal :
ETH ; code : PROG], which stores the main information of the accounts; step
records the current transaction execution step; m represents the state of the
memory and g the available gas—where A, B , W , etc. are given sets like Addr .
We have two types of transactions:
TT =̂ {contractCreation,messageCall}
A transaction can be modeled as a record with several fields (some are omited):
Transaction =̂ [Tn,Tg : N; Tp,Tv : ETH ; Ti : P ; Td : seqB ; snd : Addr ]
where, for instance, Tn is the nonce, Tg is the gas limit, Tp is the gas price and
Ti is the initialization program for the account.
Now we can model how transactions are executed. According to the YP,
a transaction is executed in four steps: (a) the checkpoint state (σ0, in YP’s
notation); (b) the post-execution provisional state (σP ); (c) the pre-final state
(σ∗); and (d) the final state (σ′) is reached after deleting all accounts that either
appear in the self-destruct list or are touched and empty. The specification of the
processing step called checkpoint state (σ0) is independent of the transaction
type and is defined as follows:
CheckpointState(s : World ; t? : Transaction; s ′ : World) =̂
TransactionValidity(s , t?)
∧ UpdateSender(s .acc t?.sender , (acc t?.sender).bal , t?.Tp, t?.Tg, a′)
∧ s .step = initial
∧ s ′.acc = s .acc ⊕ {(t?.sender , a′)}
∧ s ′.step = ccbegins
where TransactionValidity (not shown) is a complex predicate stating the con-
ditions for a transaction to be valid and UpdateSender is defined as follows:
UpdateSender(s : Acc; b, p : ETH ; g : N; s ′ : Acc) =̂
s ′.bal = b − g ∗ p ∧ s ′.nonce = s .nonce + 1 ∧ s ′.code = s .code
Hence, CheckpointState checks whether the requested transaction is valid
and in that case it (only) updates the sender account by debiting the result of
multiplying the gas price and the gas limit as given in the transaction and by
adding one to the number of transactions (s .nonce).
The transition from σ0 to σP requires the execution of the program as-
sociated to the account (or the initialization program if it is a contract cre-
ation). Then, at this point we should specify how the EVM executes (bytecode)
programs. To this end, we first need to formalize each and every EVM byte-
code instruction. Most instructions can be modeled as a transition between two
MachineState. We will do that only for a simplified version of the instruction
called create. According to the YP create “Creates a new account with asso-
ciated code”. We have identified two cases so we have:
Create =̂ Create1 ∨ Create2
where Create1 is not shown due to space restrictions. Create2 formalizes a situa-
tion where the account is actually not created due to some boundary condition:
Create2(q : Machine; w : World ; a? : Addr ; n? : N; q ′ : Machine) =̂
q.s 1 > (w .acc a?).bal ∨ n? ≥ 1024
∧ q ′.s = 〈0〉a tail(tail(tail q.s))
∧ q ′.i = M (q.i , q.s 2, q.s 3)
∧ q ′.m = q.m ∧ q ′.g = q.g
whereM updates the amount of used memory (q.i) by using the second and third
positions of the machine stack (q.s). Note that Create2 modifies the machine
state but it needs to access the world state. It also receives the address of the
account which owns the code that is executing (a?) and the number of Creates
being executed at present (n?). The account is not created because either the
balance of the caller is too low to fulfill the value transfer or there are too many
active Create calls (n? ≥ 1024). In this case the first three positions in the stack
are removed and a 0 is stacked on top of that.
Lesson learned. The YP describes the semantics of the EVM mixing informal
text with formulas written in some ad-hoc mathematical notation. In the process
of writing this specification we found many obscure (probably inconsistent) issues
in the math used in the YP. Established formal specification languages have
gone a long process of standardization and analysis; their fundamentals have
been studied for decades (maybe centuries) by some of the founding fathers of
modern mathematics and Computer Science. Even the math used in the YP
cannot be compared to well established FM. Besides, most FM are supported by
tools implementing a variety of verification techniques. Using math in the YP is
a good step forward but the invested effort would be at least partially wasted.
5 Some Verification Techniques for Set-Based Models
In this section we show the application of three verification techniques that can
be used when set-based formal specifications are available. In the first one we
show how a set-based specification can be turned into a set-based prototype,
that is an inefficient program that nonetheless is correct-by-construction and so
it can be used to analyze complex situations (Sect. 5.1). Next, we show how the
same set-based model can be used to generate test cases that can be used to test
the implementation (Sect. 5.2). Finally, we automatically prove that the same
models enjoy some properties (Sect. 5.3).
5.1 Set-based prototypes and simulations
Set-based specifications such as those presented in sections 3 and 4, can be
easily turned into set-based prototype programs. In effect, a set-based model
can be encoded in the programming language provided by the {log} (‘setlog’)
tool [18, 38]. {log} is a programming language, a satisfiability solver and an
automated theorem prover where sets are first-class entities. {log} provides the
usual Boolean connectives and most of the set and relational operators available
in set theory including binary relations. Hence, it is quite natural to encode a
set-based specification as a {log} program. Given that {log} is based on Prolog
its programs resemble Prolog programs.
The {log} encoding of RcvAddr presented in Sect. 3 is the following:
rcvAddr(S,P,Ps,S_) :-
S = {[as,As] / Rest} &
P = [_,this, addrMsg(Asm)] &
un(As,Asm,As_) &
diff(Asm,As,D) &
PsD = ris(A in D,[],true,[this,A,connectMsg]) &
PsAs = ris(A in As,[],true,[this,A,addrMsg(As_)]) &
un(PsD,PsAs,Ps) &
S_ = {[as,As_] / Rest}.
rcvAddr is a {log} clause respecting the interface of RcvAddr . In this case,
however, instead of using set membership to somewhat “type” the parameters we
rest on unification. As in Prolog, {log} programs are based on unification with
the addition of set unification. Variables must start with an uppercase letter. We
take advantage of set theory to encode other data structures such as records.
A record is a set of ordered pairs where the first component names the field
and the second is the variable holding the values. Hence, a statement such as
S = {[as,As] / Rest} (set) unifies the first parameter with a set term singling
out the record field needed in this case (As) and the rest of the record (Rest).
The same is done with packet P where _ means any value as first component and
addrMsg(Asm) gets the set of addresses received in the packet without introduc-
ing an existential quantifier. The set comprehensions used in the specification
are implemented with {log}’s so-called Restricted Intentional Sets (RIS) [17]. A
RIS is interpreted as a set comprehension where the control variable ranges over
a finite set (D and As). Finally, diff(A,B,C) is interpreted as C = A \ B and
un(A,B,C) as C = A ∪ B .
A clause such as rcvAddr can be seen both as a {log} formula and as a
{log} program. It is a formula in the sense that & is logical conjunction and so
the order of statements in rcvAddr is irrelevant due to commutativity. It is a
program simply because we can use the {log} interpreter to compute outputs
from inputs. However, given that {log} programs are meant to be prototypes we
talk of simulations or animations rather than executions.
Then, given that S and P are meant to be inputs while Ps and S_ are outputs,
we can run a simulation from an initial LocState and input packet p? such as:
S = {[as,{}] / _}
P = [_,this,addrMsg({a1,a2})]
Now, for instance, we can call rcvAddr twice chaining before and after states as
follows:
S = {[as,{}] / _} &
P = [_,this,addrMsg({a1,a2})] &
rcvAddr(S,P,Ps1,S1) &
rcvAddr(S1,[_,this,addrMsg({a1,a3})],Ps2,S2).
in which case {log} returns:
Ps1 = ris(A in {a1,a2/_N2},[],true,[this,A,connectMsg],true),
S1 = {[as,{a1,a2}]/R},
Ps2 = {[this,a3,connectMsg],[this,a1,addrMsg({a2,a1,a3})],
[this,a2,addrMsg({a2,a1,a3})] /
ris(A in _N1,[],true,[this,A,connectMsg],true)},
S2 = {[as,{a2,a1,a3}]/R}
Constraint: subset(_N2,{a1,a2}), subset(_N1,{a1,a3}),
a1 nin _N1, a2 nin _N1
That is, {log} binds values for all the free variables in a way that the formula is
satisfied (if it is satisfiable at all). In this way we can trace the execution of the
protocol w.r.t. states and outputs by starting from a given state (e.g. S) and input
values (e.g. [_,this,addrMsg({a1,a2})]), and chaining states throughout the
execution of the state transitions included in the simulation (e.g. S1 and S2).
5.2 Model-based testing
Model-based testing (MBT) is a testing methodology where test cases are drawn
from models or program specifications [42]. That is, instead of letting testers to
think what test cases are necessary to test a program, a MBT method gives a
disciplined, systematic and quantifiable algorithm for test case generation. There
are a number of MBT methods depending on the FM and the type of systems
under consideration [24]. Most MBT methods are supported by (semi)automatic
tools thus turning program testing into a more efficient process.
In particular, the Test Template Framework (TTF) can be applied to set-
based specifications [40]. Then, this means that, by writing a set-based spec-
ification you can get, almost for free, a prototype and test cases to test the
implementation.
We will apply a reduced version of the TTF to the CheckpointState specifi-
cation given in Sect. 4—see elsewhere in the literature for more examples and
applications to critical software [19, 15]. Note that in CheckpointState we have
the following post-condition:
s ′.acc = s .acc ⊕ {(t?.sender , a′)} (1)
where ⊕ is a relational operator stating that if t?.sender ∈ dom s .acc then its
relational image must be updated with a′, otherwise the pair (t?.sender , a′)
must be added to s .acc. Besides, recall that acc is a partial function, i.e. a
binary relation where all first components are different from each other. Such
data structures and operators are seldom available in high-level programming
languages. Hence, an efficient implementation of a predicate like (1) will yield a
non-trivial piece of code that deserves to be thoroughly tested, specially when
it belongs to a critical system.
The TTF defines so-called standard partitions for each set theoretic operator.
The standard partition for R ⊕G is the following:
R = ∅,G = ∅ R 6= ∅,G 6= ∅, domG ⊂ domR
R = ∅,G 6= ∅ R 6= ∅,G 6= ∅, domR ∩ domG = ∅
R 6= ∅,G = ∅ R 6= ∅,G 6= ∅, domR ⊂ domG
R 6= ∅,G 6= ∅, R 6= ∅,G 6= ∅, domR ∩ domG 6= ∅,
domR = domG ¬ (domG ⊆ domR),¬ (domR ⊆ domG)
This means that an expression of the form R⊕G should be tested with eight test
cases as follows: R and G equal to the empty set; R equal to the empty set and
G not equal to the empty set and vice versa; R and G different from the empty
set but having the same domain; and so forth. If for a particular expression some
combination of R and G is unfeasible, then it is simply discarded.
Thus, when the standard partition for ⊕ is applied to (1) in the context of
CheckpointState it yields, after some simplifications, only two test conditions:
dom s .acc = {t?.sender}
{t?.sender} ⊂ dom s .acc
That is, it make sense to test the implementation of (1) in CheckpointState when:
the address of the transaction sender is the only account in the system and when
it is not the only account in the system. However, there is more to be tested in
CheckpointState. For example, TransactionValidity is a complex predicate where
the TTF can be applied in several ways. Furthermore, the TTF dictates how the
test conditions for some lines of code must be combined with the test conditions
generated for the other lines of code.
In general, all the steps of the TTF can be (semi)automated by tools such as
Fastest [15] and other MBT methods for set-based specifications provide good
tool support as well [31].
5.3 Automated proofs
A program is correct if it verifies its specification. But if the specification is
wrong, the program will be wrong and this will be undetectable. Therefore,
effort must be made to ensure the specification is correct. The confidence on the
correctness of the specification can be increased by proving that it enjoys many
desired properties. In a full formal context, all these proofs should be mechanized,
although a good first approximation are manual proofs and a second best are
automated proofs, as in general full automation is impossible.
For set-based specifications {log} can be used as an automated theorem
prover and as a counterexample generator—that is, if a proof fails we can know
why that happened. In this case we see {log} code as formulas over the theory of
finite sets (cf. Sect. 5.1). In order to prove that a {log} formula is a theorem we
actually need to prove that its negation is unsatisfiable. For example, concerning
rcvAddr, we might prove that PsD and PsAs are disjoint sets. In this case we
can submit the following to {log}:
diff(Asm,As,D) &
PsD = ris(A in D,[],true,[this,A,connectMsg]) &
PsAs = ris(A in As,[],true,[this,A,addrMsg(As_)]) &
ndisj(PsD,PsAs).
where ndisj(A,B) is interpreted as A ∩ B 6= ∅. In this case {log} returns no
which means that the formula is unsatisfiable and so PsD and PsAs are disjoint.
As another example, we may want to prove that s .acc is still a partial function
after executing CheckpointState. This is a so-called state invariant preservation
theorem. These theorems are of the following form:
Inv ∧ Op ⇒ Inv ′ (2)
that is, if Inv holds before executing Op, then Inv also holds in the after state
(i.e., Inv ′ is true, where Inv ′ =̂ Inv [∀ v , v ′/v ]). If we want to use {log} to dis-
charge such a theorem we must check whether the negation of (2) is unsatisfiable.
Then, in this case the formula to be submitted to {log} is:
World = {[acc,Acc] / Rest} &
pfun(Acc) &
checkpointState(World,Trans,World_) &
World_ = {[acc,Acc_] / Rest} &
npfun(Acc_).
where pfun(F) is interpreted as F is a partial function and npfun as its negation.
In this case {log} returns no, which means that checkpointState preserves the
invariant, as otherwise expected.
6 Final remarks
Cryptocurrency software should be considered critical: its failures and vulner-
abilities would cause irreparable loses. Formal methods have proved to be suc-
cessful in delivering bug-free software for a range of critical systems. Hence, our
first conclusion is that the cryptocurrency community should pay attention to
formal methods. However, integrating formal methods into the development pro-
cess of highly innovative domains cannot be done all at once. Then, our second
conclusion is that the cryptocurrency community should gradually adopt formal
methods.
Specifically, we propose to start the adoption process by using formal specifi-
cation languages based on set theory and first-order logic. Most developers have
been exposed to the mathematics underlying these languages, so adoption could
be made minimizing the learning curve. Set-based specifications accurately and
concisely describe cryptocurrency software. In order to support this claim we
formally specified representative parts of two key components of cryptocurrency
software. Once a set-based specification has been written, several verification
techniques are enabled. In particular we have shown how prototypes can be
easily generated and simulations can be run on them; then, we have applied a
model-based testing method to generate test cases from a set-based specification;
and finally, we have automatically discharged some proof obligations.
However, these techniques do not allow the formal verification of the imple-
mentation. To this end more powerful languages and techniques (e.g. the Coq
proof assistant [41, 8]) can and should be adopted in future stages. This should
be done once the use of formal methods is well understood by the community.
Hopefully, the contents of this paper will convince key players of the cryp-
tocurrency community to assess the application of formal methods more thor-
oughly.
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A Subtleties and Traps with Security Properties
Security properties have proved to be unexpectedly complex to grasp and for-
malize. One of the fundamental reasons for this is that security properties are
not safety properties (w.r.t. the Alper-Schneider framework [2]). Most of the ver-
ification methods, results and tools developed for almost half a century by the
Software Engineering community have been aimed at safety properties. Then,
most of them fall short when dealing with security properties. Only very recently
some of these methods and tools have been adapted for the problem of security
properties.
For instance, safety properties enjoy, what is some times called, the refine-
ment property. This means that, if S is the description of a system verifying
safety property F and S ′ is a more deterministic refinement of S , then S ′ (auto-
matically) verifies F . However, in general, security properties do not enjoy the
refinement property. This means that even if you have proved that S verifies se-
curity property F and that S ′ is a refinement of S , then you cannot assert that S ′
verifies F . The problem is that there are implementation decisions that in spite
of generating a more deterministic system, they might introduce security issues.
A typical example is the specification of the values stored in the memory cells
delivered by the operating system to a process. At a certain level of abstraction
these values might be underspecified which implies that, potentially, any value
can be stored. Assume you can prove that this is secure. Afterwards, program-
mers decide to deliver the cells with the values left by the last process that used
that buffer. Although this is an implementation of the first specification it is
blatantly insecure.
On the other hand, reasoning about implementations provides the ultimate
guarantee that deployed mechanisms behave as expected. However, due to the
issues mentioned above, formally proving non-trivial security properties of code
might be an overwhelming task in terms of the effort required, especially com-
pared w.r.t. proving functional correctness (i.e. a safety property). In addition,
many implementation details are orthogonal to the security properties to be
established. This implies that slight changes in the implementation technology
might have devastating consequences as concerns the security of the implementa-
tion. Therefore, complementary approaches are needed when non-trivial security
properties are at stake:
1. Verification is performed on idealized models that abstract away the specifics
of any particular implementation, and yet provide a realistic setting in which
to explore the security issues that pertain to the realm of those (critical)
mechanisms.
2. Additionally, verification is performed on more concrete models where low
level mechanisms (such as pointer arithmetic) are specified.
3. Finally, the low level model is proved to be a correct implementation of the
idealized model.
A particular class of the idealized models mentioned above are those called se-
curity models. These models have played an important role in the design and eval-
uation of high assurance security systems. Their importance was already pointed
out in the Anderson report [3]. The paradigmatic Bell-LaPadula model [7], con-
ceived in 1973, constituted the first big effort on providing a formal setting in
which to study and reason on confidentiality properties of data in time-sharing
mainframe systems.
